Council of Constantinople in 381. Indeed, it was not until 388 that the imperial government unambiguously outlawed Apollinarianism throughout the empire, and that was almost certainly after the writing of the Antirrheticus, which was probably (although this remains controversial) in or around 383. So at the time of writing Gregory would have seen Apolinarius and his disciples as continuing to present a very real threat to the unity of the Church.
I believe that Apolinarius had three main concerns in the Apodeixis, all of which, like most Christological arguments, were primarily driven by soteriological considerations. Firstly, he wanted to make it clear that in order to save us, Jesus had to both fully divine and fully human 3 . He was opposed both to Arianism and to any form of docetism.
Secondly, he wanted to establish that there is nevertheless only one Christ. Again, the background is soteriological. Like Gregory and most of the earlier Eastern Fathers, Apolinarius did not usually see salvation as the Father's response to the atoning death of his Son. Instead he saw the divine Logos itself as the principal agent of our redemption: not only as teacher, law-giver and model for humanity but also as sanctifying and glorifying us by joining our human flesh to his divinity 4 and raising us up, with him, from death to resurrection glory.
In order for this to happen, there must, Apolinarius believed, be ontic continuity between the Second Person of the Trinity and Christ in his two natures. In order to save us, the divine Logos must have "become flesh", by, to use the language of Philippians 2, "humbling" himself. He could not just have joined himself to the man Jesus; that would imply a clear separation between the human and divine natures and suggest that there are "two Christs". That is something that Christian theologians as far back as Irenaeus had been anxious to guard against 5 . Moreover, Apolinarius believed, it would have inevitably led to an "adoptionist" view of Christ as a "God-filled man" -that, he claims, is what was taught by Paul of Samosata in the third century and, more recently, by Marcellus of Ancyra and his pupil Photius of Sirmium 6 . It would have put Christ on the same level as the Old Testament prophets and could not therefore form the basis of an adequate soteriology.
Furthermore, the union between the two natures must be as close and indissoluble as can be conceived. The Chalcedonian formula was of course not yet available as a model for expressing this. In its absence, it appears that Apolinarius may have been led into some unguarded expressions about the comprehensiveness of the union and about its pre-ordained and almost metaphysically necessary nature. In what seems, so far as can be judged, an accurate citation from the Apodeixis, Gregory reports Apolinarius as having said that "the man Christ pre-existed, not with the Spirit, that is God, existing separately from him" 7 . (I should explain that "Spirit" here refers to the second rather than to the third Person of the Trinity.) In other words, Apolinarius wanted to suggest that the possibility, indeed the inevitability, of the incarnation was in some sense eternally part of the Logos's eternal nature.
As an aside, I have often wondered how fair it would be to suggest that Apolinarius may here have been anticipating what I understand Karl Barth's view to have been, that there is no such thing as a pre-incarnate or un-incarnate Word; we must speak of a lÒgoj ¥sarkoj, or, at the most, of a logos incarnandus 8 . I have not explored this further, but what one can say is that in doing so one would need to have regard to the totally different metaphysical frameworks within which Apolinarius and Gregory on the one hand, and Barth on the other, were theologizing. At any rate Gregory is able to point to other statements of Apolinarius in a similar vein (although some of them he almost certainly, for whatever reason, misquotes.) He interprets them in what seems to have been a rather plodding and literalistic way. If Apolinarius believed that Christ had been enfleshed from all eternity, his flesh must have originated in heaven rather than in Mary's womb. That interpretation makes Apolinarius's Christology look ridiculous; it is however almost certainly a misunderstanding of what Apolinarius really wanted to say. Whatever Apolinarius's view might have been about the lÒgoj ¥sarkoj, he explicitly denies that "the flesh of the Lord is from above and not from the Virgin Mary" -in fact in an earlier work he had anathematized those who hold this view 9 .
Apolinarius's third concern was to demonstrate that Jesus could not have had a human mind. This was partly because of the difficulty of there being two potentially contradictory sources of knowledge and will in a single human being. That is of course a widely recognised difficulty in classical Christology, as is demonstrated by developments after Chalcedon, up to the seventh century monothelete controversy and perhaps beyond. The other was again soteriological. As mentioned above, Apolinarius saw Christ's saving role as one of sanctification, of restoring his and therefore our human nature to its original state of pure virtue. This, he believed, would be impossible if he had had a human mind, which is inherently, and, in his view, irredeemably, mutable and unstable 10 .
So his central notion, in the Apodeixis, is that the eternal Logos took the place of Jesus's human mind. In the context of the development of Christology 7 Ibidem, GNO 3/1, 147. 8 My original source for this was http://postbarthian.com/2014/08 /26/logos-asarkos/ [22.10.2016] . I subsequently found a useful summary of Barth's view (which has been further developed by Robert Jenson) in C. Gunton, The Barth Lectures, ed. P.H. Brazier, Edinburgh 2007, 167-170. 9 St Gregory of Nyssa, Anti-Apollinarian Writings, p. 55-58. 10 Cf. ibidem, in the fourth century, this may well not in itself have been a particularly revolutionary view. The great pillar of orthodoxy, Athanasius himself, may well not have believed that Jesus had a human soul 11 , although the language of the Tomus ad Antiochenos, drawn up after the synod he convened at Alexandra in 361 is, perhaps intentionally, ambiguous -possibly in order to keep on board the representatives of Apolinarius who were present 12 For him, as for Apolinarius, the soteriological significance of the incarnation was that humanity should be refashioned after the model of the divine Logos, the archetype of humanity in whose image Adam and Eve were created 13 . He was not particularly interested in the precise nature of Christ's humanity, and its relationship with his divinity. But, according to Charles Raven, he was nevertheless "an Apollinarian at heart" 14 .
Apolinarius goes on to make what is perhaps the most ingenious of his intellectual moves. He argues that, even without a human mind, Christ was truly a complete man and, as such, a single person. The defining characteristic of human beings is, he claimed, that they should comprise three separate elements, a body, a mind or "spirit" and an animal soul. Jesus Christ met this specification. The fact that the second element, the mind, the centre of Christ's identity and consciousness as it is of ours, was identified with the Second Person of the Trinity was neither here nor there.
Gregory argues convincingly however that Apolinarius's "enfleshed mind" Christology would mean that Jesus Christ was not fully human and could not therefore save humankind. He follows the spirit although not the letter of his friend's Gregory of Nazianzus's celebrated anti-Apollinarian dictum, often rendered as quod non est assumptum non est sanatum 15 . The human mind is affected by sin just as much as the human body, and is equally in need of salvation. It is true that only a creature with a rational mind can sin, but "the mind is not sin!" says Gregory 16 . He rejects Apolinarius's contention that our minds are inherently incapable of becoming what they were originally intended to be, the image and likeness of God 17 .
On the other hand, he accuses Apolinarius of over-emphasizing the ontic continuity between the eternal Logos and Jesus of Nazareth. Apolinarius goes 11 so far, he says, as to claim that, in the incarnation, God himself is somehow transformed into a complex, and therefore inherently passible being, who can die on the cross. Gregory argues that it is an absurd and blasphemous idea that God should die 18 ; even today, with the advantage of the Chalcedonian definition of the hypostatic union, many intelligent Christians (I'm not sure how many theologians!) would agree, as a quick Google search for "Did God die on the cross?" will demonstrate. In any case, Gregory believed that it was the divine Logos, "mixed" with Christ's humanity, rather than the Father, who effected the resurrection, That would have become impossible if the Logos had died with the man Jesus 19 .
Gregory also argued that Apolinarius's Christological model implies that the infinite God and the finite human mind are on the same ontological level, so the former could be substituted for the latter in the anthropological constitution of the incarnate Christ 20 . Using a contemporary analogy, it would treat God as something that could be as it were physically transplanted into the human body, or like someone claiming that God had been substituted for his left arm. This seems to me to be a fair argument so far as it goes. Nevertheless it may raise the question as to whether the same objection could not be levelled against the Chalcedonian formula. That too arguably similarly links together the infinite creator with the finite creature in a metaphysically puzzling, or at any rate mysterious, way.
But can it be said that in the face of Apolinarius's challenge Gregory is able to give an adequate alternative account of the unity of Christ's person? His main model for the relationship between the Christ's human and divine natures is that they were "mixed" in Mary's womb 21 . (Apolinarius also in fact on one occasion talks in what seem to be quite general terms of the two natures being "mixed" and Gregory commends him for doing so 22 .) In ancient philosophy there were a number of different understandings of how mixture worked and the extent to which the separate substances maintained their identity in the mixture 23 . The concept of mixture is nevertheless in any case Christologically problematic. It is in fact open to exactly the same objection as that which Gregory raises against Apolinarius's model -it implies that God and humanity are on the same ontological lever and can thus be "mixed" together like for example vinegar and water 24 .
Gregory clearly feels however that he has not yet adequately refuted Apolinarius's charge that he is teaching "two Christs". In response to this, the final 18 Cf. St Gregory of Nyssa, Anti-Apollinarian Writings, p. 69. 19 Cf Gregorius Nyssenus, Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium, GNO 3/1, 154. 20 Cf. St Gregory of Nyssa, Anti-Apollinarian Writings, p. 70-71. 21 Cf. ibidem, p. 77. 22 Cf. Gregorius Nyssenus, Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium, GNO 3/1, 217. 23 Cf. St Gregory of Nyssa, Anti-Apollinarian Writings, p. 208, n. 403 and references given there. 24 Cf. ibidem, p.78, n. 395. move he makes is in effect to develop and extend the concept, or metaphor, of mixture. He proposed that the complete unity between the two "mixed" natures was postponed until after Christ's glorification 25 . His divinity then overwhelmed his humanity and removed all his human characteristics. In a famous analogy, he compares this with the way the water of the sea overwhelms a drop of vinegar dropped into it -in other words on the basis of the Stoic understanding of mixture that Gregory seems to be adopting here, he is saying that although Christ's human nature was not, at the metaphysical level, obliterated at the time of his glorification, the properties associated with it were totally transformed 26 . On this basis he has, anachronistically but not unreasonably, been accused of taking a Nestorian view of Christ before his glorification and a miaphysite one after it.
But a defence can nevertheless be made of Gregory's Christological model, to the effect that it is oriented to soteriology rather than to metaphysics. Compared with the quasi-scientific anthropological schema offered by Apolinarius, it is fluid and dynamic -as Christ's human nature is overwhelmed by the divinity at his glorification, so will ours be, as we share his humanity and are members of his ecclesial body 27 . In the words of the celebrated "exchange formula", which in its basic form goes back to Irenaeus 28 , God became man so that man could become God.
In conclusion, the controversy between Gregory and Apolinarius demonstrates that, in the context of the history of dogma, both Gregory and Apolinarius can be seen as making significant contributions to the development of the Church's Christological teaching. Both Apolinarius's stress on the indivisible unity of Christ and Gregory's on the notion that "what is not assumed is not healed" were essential elements in what emerged seventy years later in the Chalcedonian definition.
(Summary)
The argument in the 380s between Gregory and Apolinarius, as set out Gregory's Antirrheticus adversus Apolinarium, can be seen as a significant step in the development of the Church's Christological teaching. Apolinarius's notion that the eternal Logos took the place of Jesus Christ's human mind is designed to establish the unity of his person, by providing a basis for the ontic continuity between the Second Person of the Trinity and Christ in his two natures. Commendably, he wants to counter any suggestion of separation between the human and divine natures ("two Christs"), which he sees as inevitably leading to an "adoptionist" view of Christ as a "God-filled man"; that would put Christ on the same level as the Old Testament prophets and could not form the basis of an adequate soteriology. Gregory argues convincingly however that Apolinarius's "enfleshed mind" Christology would mean that Jesus Christ was not fully human and could not therefore save humankind. But in the face of Apolinarius's challenge he cannot give an adequate account of Christ's unity during his earthly career. He remains open to Apolinarius's charge of a "divisive" Christology by in effect postponing the complete unity until after Christ's glorification, when his divinity overwhelmed his humanity and removed all his human characteristics, in the same way as the water of the sea overwhelms a drop of vinegar dropped into it. On this basis he has, anachronistically but not unreasonably, been accused of taking a Nestorian view of Christ before his glorification and a monophysite one after it. Both Apolinarius's stress on the unity of Christ and Gregory's on the notion that 'what is not assumed is not healed' (Nazianzen's phrase) were essential elements in what emerged seventy years later in the Chalcedonian definition.
SPORY CHRYSTOLOGICZNE: APOLINARY Z LAODYCEI I ŚW. GRZEGORZ Z NYSSY
(Streszczenie)
Spór między Apolinarym z Laodycei i Grzegorzem z Nyssy, mający miejsce w 380 r. i dotyczący dzieła tego ostatniego: Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium, może być postrzegany jako istotny krok w rozwoju chrystologicznego nauczania Kościoła.
Pogląd Apolinarego, że odwieczny Logos zajął miejsce ludzkiego umysłu Jezusa Chrystusa, miał na celu ustanowienie jedności Jego osoby, zapewniając podstawę bytowej ciągłości między drugą Osobą Trójcy Świętej i Chrystusem w jego dwóch naturach. Słusznie chciał on przeciwdziałać wszelkiej sugestii rozdziału między ludzką i boską naturą ("dwoma Chrystusami"), którą postrzega, jako nieuchronnie prowadzącą do "adopcyjnego" ujęcia Chrystusa jako człowieka "wypełnionego Bogiem" -stawiałaby ona tym samym Chrystusa na tym samym poziomie co proroków Starego Testamentu i jako taka nie mogłaby stanowić podstawy odpowiedniej soteriologii.
